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Abstract: In this paper, we investigate a class of time-inconsistent discrete-time stochastic linear-
quadratic optimal control problems, whose time-consistent solutions consist of an open-loop equilibrium
control and a linear feedback equilibrium strategy. The open-loop equilibrium control is defined for
a given initial pair, while the linear feedback equilibrium strategy is defined for all the initial pairs.
Maximum-principle-type necessary and sufficient conditions containing stationary and convexity are
derived for the existence of these two time-consistent solutions, respectively. Furthermore, for the case
where the system matrices are independent of the initial time, we show that the existence of the open-
loop equilibrium control for a given initial pair is equivalent to the solvability of a set of nonsymmetric
generalized difference Riccati equations and a set of linear difference equations. Moreover, the existence
of linear feedback equilibrium strategy is equivalent to the solvability of another set of symmetric
generalized difference Riccati equations.
Key words: Time-inconsistency, stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control, forward-backward
stochastic difference equation
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1 Introduction
Consider the following discrete-time dynamic system{
Xk+1 = f(k,Xk, uk, wk),
Xt = x ∈ R
n, k ∈ Tt, t ∈ T,
(1.1)
where T = {0, 1, · · · , N − 1} with N being a positive integer, and Tt = {t, · · · , N − 1} for t ∈ T. In
(1.1), {Xk, k ∈ T˜t} and {uk, k ∈ Tt} with T˜t = {t, t+ 1, · · · , N} are the state process and the control
process, respectively; and {wk, k ∈ Tt} is a stochastic disturbance process. Introduce the following
cost functional associated with (1.1)
J(t, x;u) =
N−1∑
k=t
E
[
e−δ(k−t)L(k,Xk, uk)
]
+ E
[
e−δ(N−t)h(XN )
]
. (1.2)
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Let U [t, N − 1] be a set of admissible controls. Then, the standard discrete-time stochastic optimal
control problem is stated as follows.
Problem (C). For (1.1), (1.2) and the initial pair (t, x) ∈ T×Rn, find a u¯ ∈ U [t, N − 1] such that
J(t, x; u¯) = inf
u∈U [t,N−1]
J(t, x;u). (1.3)
Any u¯ ∈ U [t, N − 1] satisfying (1.3) is called an optimal control for the initial pair (t, x); X¯ = {X¯k =
X¯(k; t, x, u¯), k ∈ T˜t} is called the corresponding optimal trajectory, and (X¯, u¯) is referred as an optimal
pair.
For Problem (C), dynamic programming is a fundamental technique to find its optimal control. By
studying the incremental behavior of optimal cost-to-go function as one works backward in time, the
derived difference equation is termed as Bellman dynamic programming equation, which is associated
with Bellman’s principle of optimality. Let u¯ be an optimal control of Problem (C) for the initial
pair (t, x), and reconsider versions of Problem (C) along the optimal trajectory X¯. For any τ ∈
Tt+1 = {t + 1, ..., N − 1}, Bellman’s principle of optimality tells us that u¯|Tτ (the restriction of u¯ on
Tτ = {τ, ..., N − 1}) is an optimal control of Problem (C) for the initial pair (τ, X¯(τ ; t, x, u¯)). This
property is also referred as the time consistency of optimal control. Time consistency ensures that
one needs only to solve an optimal control problem for a given initial pair, and the obtained optimal
control is also optimal along the optimal trajectory.
However, the time consistency of optimal control fails quite often in many situations. To see this,
let us look at a simple example.
Example 1.1. Consider a stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) optimal control with an
one-dimensional controlled system{
Xk+1 = (Xk + uk) +Xkwk,
Xt = x ∈ R, t = 0, k ∈ {t, ..., 3}
(1.4)
and the cost functional
J(t, x;u) =
3∑
k=t
E
[ 1
1 + (k − t)
u2k
]
+ E
[ 2
1 + (4− t)
X24
]
. (1.5)
Here, w0, ..., w3 ∈ R, are mutually independent with properties E[wk] = 0, E[w2k] = 1. Find a control
to minimize the cost functional (1.5).
Solution. Note that t = 0 and
J(0, x;u) ≥
1
1 + (4− 0)
3∑
k=0
E|uk|
2.
Hence, there exists a unique optimal control for the initial pair (0, x),
u¯
0,x
k = −W
−1
0,kP0,k+1X¯
0,x
k ≡ K¯0,kX¯
0,x
k , k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} (1.6)
with 
P0,k = 2P0,k+1 − P0,k+1W
−1
0,kP0,k+1,
W0,k =
1
1+(k−0) + P0,k+1,
P0,4 =
2
1+(4−0) , k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
and {
X¯
0,x
k+1 = (X¯
0,x
k + u¯
0,x
k ) + X¯
0,x
k wk,
X¯
0,x
0 = x, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
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Applying u¯0,x, we get X¯0,x1 . Reconsider the controlled system{
Xk+1 = (Xk + uk) +Xkwk,
X1 = X¯
0,x
1 , k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
with the cost functional (1.5) (of t = 1), i.e.,
J(1, X¯0,x1 ;u) =
3∑
k=1
E
[ 1
1 + (k − 1)
u2k
]
+ E
[ 2
1 + (4 − 1)
X24
]
.
For such a new LQ problem (with the initial pair (1, X¯0,x1 )), its optimal control is given by
ûk = −W
−1
1,kP1,k+1X̂k ≡ K̂1,kX̂k, k ∈ {1, 2, 3} (1.7)
with {
X̂k+1 = (X̂k + ûk) + X̂kwk,
X̂1 = X¯
t,x
1 , k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
and 
P1,k = 2P1,k+1 − P1,k+1W
−1
1,kP1,k+1,
W1,k =
1
1+(k−1) + P1,k+1,
P1,N =
2
1+(4−1) , k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
A simple calculation yields
K¯0,1 = −0.6038 and K̂1,1 = −0.4979,
which imply u¯0,x1 6= û1. Hence, the restriction of u¯
0,x on {1, 2, 3} is not the optimal control for the initial
pair (1, X¯0,x1 ) as it is different from (1.7). Such a phenomenon is referred as the time inconsistency. 
Both e−δ(k−t) and 11+(k−t) in the cost functionals (1.2) and (1.5) are called the time-discounting
functions. The term time discounting is broadly used “to encompass any reason for caring less
about a future consequence, including factors that diminish the expected utility generated by a fu-
ture consequence” [10]. e−δ(k−t) is referred as the constant discounting or exponential discounting,
and δ is termed as the discounting rate. As exponential function has the property of group, i.e.,
e−δ(k−t) = e−δ(k−τ)e−δ(τ−t), intertemporal decision optimization problems with exponential discount-
ing, including Problem (C), are time-consistent. Such kind of decision optimization problems is exten-
sively studied in the communities of economics, finance, and control, etc.
Functions like 11+(k−t) are of hyperbolic discounting, which is well documented and often used to
describe the situations with declining discounting rate. As the hyperbolic discounting function loses the
property of group, the dynamic optimization problem is time-inconsistent in the sense that Bellman’s
principle of optimality no longer holds. In the survey paper [10], several types of experimental evidences
are presented to show the reasonableness of hyperbolic discounting other than exponential discounting;
a particular example is that people always prefer the smaller-sooner reward to the larger-later reward.
Furthermore, quasi-geometric discounting, mean variance utility and endogenous habit formation are
several other representative examples [5, 15] that will ruin the time consistency.
Introduce the system {
Xk+1 = f(t, k, x,Xk, uk, wk),
Xt = x ∈ Rn, k ∈ Tt, t ∈ T
(1.8)
and the cost functional
J(t, x;u) =
N−1∑
k=t
E
[
L(t, k, x,Xk, uk)
]
+ E
[
h(t, x,XN )
]
. (1.9)
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Consider the following optimal control problem.
Problem (N). For (1.8), (1.9) and the initial pair (t, x) ∈ T×Rn, find a u¯ ∈ U [t, N − 1] such that
J(t, x; u¯) = inf
u∈U [t,N−1]
J(t, x;u),
where U [t, N − 1] is a set of admissible controls.
Different from (1.1) and (1.2), the initial time t enters explicitly into (1.8) and (1.9). This means
the controlled system and the cost functional are modified at different initial times. Furthermore,
the cost functional (1.9) can also be viewed as the general discounting, which includes the hyperbolic
discounting, exponential discounting and quasi-geometric discounting as special cases. Therefore,
Problem (N) is time-inconsistent, in general.
Due to the time inconsistency, there are two different ways to handle Problem (N). The first one is
the static formulation or pre-commitment formulation. If the initial strategy is kept all the way from
the initial time, then the strategy can be implemented as planned. This approach neglects the time
inconsistency, and the optimal control is optimal only when viewed at the initial time. Differently, an-
other approach addresses the time inconsistency in a dynamic manner. Instead of seeking an “optimal
control”, some kinds of equilibrium solutions are dealt with. This is mainly motivated by practical
applications in economics and finance, and has recently attracted considerable interest and efforts.
The explicit formulation of time inconsistency was initiated by Strotz [22] in 1955, whereas its
qualitative analysis can be traced back to the work of Smith [21]. In the discrete-time case, Strotz’s
idea is to tackle the time inconsistency by a lead-follower game with hierarchical structure. Particularly,
controls at different time points were viewed as different selves (players), and every self integrated the
policies of his successor into his own decision. By a backward procedure, the equilibrium policy (if
exists) was obtained. Inspired by Strotz and intending to tackling practical problems in economics
and finance, lots of works were concerned with time inconsistency of dynamic systems described by
ordinary difference or differential equations; see, for example, [8, 9, 11, 15, 16, 18] and references
therein. Unfortunately, as pointed out by Ekeland [8, 9], Strotz’s equilibrium policy typically fails to
exist and is hard to prove the existence. Thus, it is of great importance to develop a general theory on
time-inconsistent optimal control. This, on the one hand, can enrich the optimal control theory, and
on the other hand, can provide instructive methodology to push the solvability of practical problems.
Recently, this topic has attracted considerable attention from the theoretic control community; see,
for example, [5, 13, 14, 24, 26, 28, 29] and references therein.
Concerned with the time-inconsistent LQ problems, we study two kinds of time-consistent equilib-
rium solutions, which are the open-loop equilibrium control and the closed-loop equilibrium strategy.
The separate investigations of such two formulations are due to the fact that in the dynamic game
theory, open-loop control distinguishes significantly from closed-loop strategy [3, 4, 23, 30]. To com-
pare, open-loop formulation is to find an open-loop equilibrium “control”, while the “strategy” is the
object of closed-loop formulation. By a strategy, we mean a decision rule that a controller uses to
select a control action based on the available information set. Mathematically, a strategy is a map-
ping or operator on the information set. When substituting the available information into a strategy,
the open-loop value or open-loop realization of this strategy is obtained. Furthermore, an open-loop
equilibrium control is corresponding to a given initial pair, whereas the linear feedback equilibrium
strategy is defined for all the initial pairs. For more about the terms of open-loop, closed-loop, control
and strategy, we refer the readers to, for example, the monograph [3].
Strotz’s equilibrium solution [22] is essentially a closed-loop equilibrium strategy, which is further
elaborately developed by Yong to the LQ optimal control [26, 29] as well as the nonlinear optimal
control [28, 27]. In contrast, open-loop equilibrium control is extensively studied by Hu-Jin-Zhou
[13, 14] and Yong [29]. In particular, the closed-loop formulation can be viewed as the extension of
Bellman’s dynamic programming, and the corresponding equilibrium strategy (if exists) is derived by
a backward procedure [26, 27, 28, 29]. Differently, the open-loop equilibrium control is characterized
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via the maximum-principle-like methodology [13, 14].
Though the time-inconsistent optimal control has gained considerable attention, its theory is far
from being mature. Concerned with the LQ problems, general necessary and sufficient conditions still
do not include the existence of time-consistent equilibrium control/strategy. Hence, more elaborate
efforts should be paid on such topic, and more insightful results are much desirable. In this paper, a
general discrete-time time-inconsistent stochastic LQ optimal control is investigated, and no definite-
ness constraint is posed on the state and control weighting matrices. Such indefinite setting provides
a maximal capacity to model and deal with LQ-type problems, whose study will generalize existing
results to some extent. For more about standard (time-consistent) indefinite LQ problems, readers are
referred to [1, 2, 7]. Under this general condition, this paper intends obtaining some neat results on
the existence of time-consistent equilibrium control/strategy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the open-loop time-consistent
equilibrium control of Problem (LQ) for a given initial pair is introduced, whose existence is character-
ized by some maximum-principle-type conditions. The existence of an open-loop equilibrium control
for any given initial pair is then shown to be equivalent to the solvability of a set of nonsymmetric
generalized difference Riccati equations (GDREs, for short) and a set of linear difference equations
(LDEs, for short). In Section 3, the linear feedback time-consistent equilibrium strategy is investi-
gated, which is defined for all the initial pairs. By also a maximum-principle-like methodology, a set
of symmetric GDREs is introduced to characterized the existence of linear feedback time-consistent
equilibrium strategy. Sections 4 presents some comparisons between the open-loop equilibrium control
and the linear feedback equilibrium strategy. Section 5 gives several examples, and Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 Open-loop time-consistent equilibrium control
Consider the following controlled stochastic difference equation (S∆E, for short){
Xtk+1 = At,kX
t
k +Bt,kuk +
(
Ct,kX
t
k +Dt,kuk
)
wk,
Xtt = x, k ∈ Tt, t ∈ T,
(2.1)
where At,k, Ct,k ∈ Rn×n, Bt,k, Dt,k ∈ Rn×m are deterministic matrices; {Xtk, k ∈ T¯t} , X
t and
{uk, k ∈ Tt} , u are the state process and the control process, respectively. In (2.1), the initial time
t in these matrices and the state is to emphasize the property that the matrices and the state may
change according to t. The noise {wk, k ∈ T} is assumed to be a martingale difference sequence defined
on a probability space (Ω,F , P ) with
E[wk+1|Fk] = 0, E[(wk+1)
2|Fk] = 1, k ≥ 0. (2.2)
Here, E[ · |Fk] is the conditional mathematical expectation with respect to Fk = σ{x0, wl, l =
0, 1, · · · , k} and F−1 is understood as {∅,Ω}. The cost functional associated with system (2.1) is
J(t, x;u) =
N−1∑
k=t
E
[
(Xtk)
TQt,kX
t
k + u
T
kRt,kuk
]
+ E
[
(XtN )
TGtX
t
N
]
, (2.3)
whereQt,k, Rt,k, k ∈ Tt and Gt are deterministic symmetric matrices of appropriate dimensions. Differ-
ent from [13] [26] [28] [29], we do not pose any definiteness constraint on the state and the control weight
matrices. Let L2F(Tt;H) be a set of H-valued processes such that for any its element ν = {νk, k ∈ Tt}
νk is Fk−1-measurable and
∑N−1
k=t E|νk|
2 < ∞. In addition, for k ∈ Tt, L2F(k;H) is a set of H-valued
random variables such that any its element ξ is Fk−1-measurable and E|ξ|2 < ∞. Throughout this
paper, (t, x) is called an admissible initial time-state pair or simply an initial pair for (2.1) if t ∈ T
and x ∈ L2F(t;R
n). Consider the following time-inconsistent stochastic LQ problem.
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Problem (LQ). For (2.1), (2.3) and the initial pair (t, x), find a u∗ ∈ L2F(Tt;R
m), such that
J(t, x;u∗) = inf
u∈L2
F
(Tt;Rm)
J(t, x;u). (2.4)
In this section, we investigate the open-loop equilibrium control, whose definition below is a discrete-
time version of [13].
Definition 2.1. ut,x,∗ ∈ L2F(Tt;R
m) is called an open-loop equilibrium control of Problem (LQ)
for the initial pair (t, x), if the following inequality holds for any k ∈ Tt and uk ∈ L2F(k;R
m)
J(k,Xt,x,∗k ;u
t,x,∗|Tk) ≤ J(k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (uk, u
t,x,∗|Tk+1)). (2.5)
Here, ut,x,∗|Tk and u
t,x,∗|Tk+1 are the restrictions of u
t,x,∗ on Tk and Tk+1, respectively, and X
t,x,∗ is
given by {
X
t,x,∗
k+1 = Ak,kX
t,x,∗
k +Bk,ku
t,x,∗
k +
(
Ck,kX
t,x,∗
k +Dk,ku
t,x,∗
k
)
wk,
X
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt.
(2.6)
Remark 2.2. By Definition 2.1, an open-loop equilibrium control ut,x,∗ is time-consistent along
the equilibrium trajectory Xt,x,∗ in the sense that for any k ∈ Tt, ut,x,∗|Tk is an open-loop equilibrium
control for the initial pair (k,Xt,x,∗k ). Furthermore, (2.5) is a local optimality condition, as the control
(uk, u
t,x,∗|Tk+1) differs from u
t,x,∗|Tk = (u
t,x,∗
k , u
t,x,∗|Tk+1) only at time point k.
Remark 2.3. To understand the so-called “equilibrium” in Definition 2.1, we introduce a game,
termed as Problem (HG), with a hierarchical structure. The cost functional of Player k (k = t, · · · , N−
1) is
Jk(uk, u−k) , J(k,X
k
k ;u|Tk) =
N−1∑
ℓ=k
E
[
(Xkℓ )
TQk,ℓX
k
ℓ + u
T
ℓ Rk,ℓuℓ
]
+ E
[
(XkN )
TGkX
k
N
]
(2.7)
with u−k
∆
= {ut, · · · , uk−1, uk+1, · · · , uN−1}. In (2.7), uk is the action of Player k, and {Xkℓ , ℓ ∈ T¯k} ,
Xk is the internal state of Player k driven by all the actions {uℓ, ℓ ∈ Tt}. Indeed, {ut, · · · , uk−1} enters
into Xk via its initial state{
Xkℓ+1 = Ak,ℓX
k
ℓ +Bk,ℓuℓ +
(
Ck,ℓX
k
ℓ +Dk,ℓuℓ
)
wℓ,
Xkk = X
k−1
k , ℓ ∈ Tk
(2.8)
with Xk−1k being the internal state of Player k− 1 at time point k, as X
k−1
k is essentially a functional
of {ut, · · · , uk−1}. This is why we denote J(k,Xkk ;u|Tk) as Jk(uk, u−k). Furthermore, in (2.8), X
k
k =
Xk−1k indicates a forward hierarchical structure of Problem (HG): Player k − 1 could be viewed as the
leader of Player k. From (2.3), (2.5) and (2.7), we have
Jk(u
t,x,∗
k , u
t,x,∗
−k ) ≤ Jk(uk, u
t,x,∗
−k ).
Therefore, ut,x,∗ is the Nash equilibrium of Problem (HG). Hence, in Definition 2.1, we call ut,x,∗ the
equilibrium control.
The following theorem is concerned with the existence of open-loop equilibrium control.
Theorem 2.4. Given an initial pair (t, x), the following statements are equivalent.
(i) There exists an open-loop equilibrium control of Problem (LQ) for the initial pair (t, x).
(ii) There exists a control ut,x,∗ such that for any k ∈ Tt, the following forward-backward stochastic
difference equations (FBS∆E, for short) has a solution (Xk,∗, Zk,∗)
X
k,∗
ℓ+1 = Ak,ℓX
k,∗
ℓ +Bk,ℓu
t,x,∗
ℓ +
(
Ck,ℓX
k,∗
ℓ +Dk,ℓu
t,x,∗
ℓ
)
wℓ,
Z
k,∗
ℓ = A
T
k,ℓE(Z
k,∗
ℓ+1|Fℓ−1) + C
T
k,ℓE(Z
k,∗
ℓ+1wℓ|Fℓ−1) +Qk,ℓX
k,∗
ℓ ,
X
k,∗
k = X
t,x,∗
k , Z
k,∗
N = GkX
k,∗
N , ℓ ∈ Tk
(2.9)
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with the stationary condition
0 = Rk,ku
t,x,∗
k +B
T
k,kE(Z
k,∗
k+1|Fk−1) +D
T
k,kE(Z
k,∗
k+1wk|Fk−1), (2.10)
and the convexity condition
inf
u¯k∈L
2
F
(k;Rm)
{N−1∑
ℓ=k
E
[(
Y kℓ
)T
Qk,ℓY
k
ℓ
]
+ E
[
u¯TkRk,ku¯k
]
+ E
[(
Y kN
)T
GkY
k
N
]}
≥ 0. (2.11)
Here, Y k is given by 
Y kℓ+1 = Ak,ℓY
k
ℓ + Ck,ℓY
k
ℓ wℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk+1,
Y kk+1 = Bk,ku¯k +Dk,ku¯kwk,
Y kk = 0,
(2.12)
and Xt,x,∗ is given in (2.6).
Furthermore, ut,x,∗ given in (ii) is an open-loop equilibrium control.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
To proceed, we now recall the pseudo-inverse of a matrix. By [19], for a given matrix M ∈ Rn×m,
there exists a unique matrix in Rm×n denoted by M † such that{
MM †M =M, M †MM † =M †,
(MM †)T =MM †, (M †M)T =M †M.
(2.13)
This M † is called the Moore-Penrose inverse of M . The following lemma is from [1].
Lemma 2.5. Let matrices L, M and N be given with appropriate size. Then, LXM = N has a
solution X if and only if LL†NMM † = N . Moreover, the solution of LXM = N can be expressed as
X = L†NM † + Y − L†LYMM †, where Y is a matrix with appropriate size.
From (2.10) and Lemma 2.5, an open-loop equilibrium control is given by
u
t,x,∗
k = −R
†
k,k
[
BTk,kE(Z
k,∗
k+1|Fk−1) +D
T
k,kE(Z
k,∗
k+1wk|Fk−1)
]
, k ∈ Tt. (2.14)
Substituting (2.14) into (2.9), we get a set of FBS∆Es

X
k,∗
ℓ+1 = Ak,ℓX
t,∗
ℓ −Bk,ℓR
†
ℓ,ℓ
[
BTℓ,ℓE(Z
ℓ,∗
ℓ+1|Fℓ−1) +D
T
ℓ,ℓE(Z
ℓ,∗
ℓ+1wℓ|Fℓ−1)
]
+
{
Ck,ℓX
k,∗
ℓ −Dk,ℓR
†
ℓ,ℓ
[
BTℓ,ℓE(Z
ℓ,∗
ℓ+1|Fℓ−1) +D
T
ℓ,ℓE(Z
ℓ,∗
ℓ+1wℓ|Fℓ−1)
]}
wℓ,
Z
k,∗
ℓ = A
T
k,ℓE(Z
k,∗
ℓ+1|Fℓ−1) + C
T
k,ℓE(Z
k,∗
ℓ+1wℓ|Fℓ−1) +Qk,ℓX
k,∗
ℓ ,
X
k,∗
t = X
t,x,∗
k , Z
k,∗
N = GkX
k,∗
N , ℓ ∈ Tk+1,
k ∈ Tt,
(2.15)
coupled with
X
t,x,∗
k+1 = Ak,kX
t,x,∗
k −Bk,kR
†
k,k
[
BTk,kE(Z
k,∗
k+1|Fk−1) +D
T
k,kE(Z
k,∗
k+1wk|Fk−1)
]
+
{
Ck,kX
t,x,∗
k −Dk,kR
†
k,k
[
BTk,kE(Z
k,∗
k+1|Fk−1) +D
T
k,kE(Z
k,∗
k+1wk|Fk−1)
]}
wk,
X
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt.
To get a more convenient form of the open-loop equilibrium control, we should decouple (2.15) to
obtain some Riccati-like equations. However, (2.15) is not a single FBS∆E but a set of FBS∆Es
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coupled with the open-loop equilibrium state Xt,x,∗. To this end, we will focus on a specific case where
the system equation is {
Xk+1 = (AkXk +Bkuk) + (CkXk +Dkuk)wk,
Xt = x, k ∈ Tt.
(2.16)
Different from (2.1), the system matrices in (2.16) are assumed to be independent of the initial time
t. The following result is on the equivalent characterization of the existence of open-loop equilibrium
control of Problem (LQ) corresponding to (2.16) and (2.3).
Theorem 2.6. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) For any initial pair (t, x) ∈ T × Rn, there exists an open-loop equilibrium control of Problem
(LQ) corresponding to (2.16), (2.3) and the initial pair (t, x).
(ii) The set of GDREs

Pt,k = Qt,k +A
T
k Pt,k+1Ak + C
T
k Pt,k+1Ck −H
T
t,kW
†
k,kHk,k,
Pt,N = Gt,
k ∈ Tt,
Wt,tW
†
t,tHt,t −Ht,t = 0,
t ∈ T
(2.17)
and the set of LDEs 

St,k = Qt,k +A
T
k St,k+1Ak + C
T
k St,k+1Ck,
St,N = Gt,
k ∈ Tt
Rt,t +B
T
t St,t+1Bt +D
T
t St,t+1Dt ≥ 0,
t ∈ T
(2.18)
are solvable in the sense that the constrained conditions Wt,tW
†
t,tHt,t −Ht,t = 0, Rt,t +B
T
t St,t+1Bt +
DTt St,t+1Dt ≥ 0, t ∈ T, are satisfied. Here,
Wk,k = Rk,k +B
T
k Pk,k+1Bk +D
T
k Pk,k+1Dk,
Hk,k = B
T
k Pk,k+1Ak +D
T
k Pk,k+1Ck,
Ht,k = B
T
k Pt,k+1Ak +D
T
k Pt,k+1Ck,
k ∈ Tt, t ∈ T.
(2.19)
Under any of above conditions, the open-loop equilibrium control for the initial pair (t, x) admits
the feedback form
u
t,x,∗
k = −W
†
k,kHk,kX
t,x,∗
k , k ∈ Tt, (2.20)
where {
X
t,x,∗
k+1 =
(
Ak −BkW
†
k,kHk,k
)
X
t,x,∗
k +
(
Ck −DkW
†
k,kHk,k
)
X
t,x,∗
k wk,
X
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt.
(2.21)
Proof. (ii)⇒(i). For any given initial pair (t, x) ∈ T× Rn, let
u˜
t,x
k = −W
†
k,kHk,kX˜
t,x
k , k ∈ Tt, (2.22)
where {
X˜
t,x
k+1 =
(
Ak −BkW
†
k,kHk,k
)
X˜
t,x
k +
(
Ck −DkW
†
k,kHk,k
)
X˜
t,x
k wk,
X˜
t,x
t = x, k ∈ Tt.
(2.23)
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Then, the following FBS∆E
X˜kℓ+1 = AℓX˜
k
ℓ +Bℓu˜
t,x
ℓ +
{
CℓX˜
k
ℓ +Dℓu˜
t,x
ℓ
}
wℓ,
Z˜kℓ = A
T
ℓ E(Z˜
k
ℓ+1|Fℓ−1) + C
T
ℓ E(Z˜
k
ℓ+1wℓ|Fℓ−1) +Qk,ℓX˜
k
k ,
X˜kk = X˜
t,x
k , Z˜
k
N = GkX˜
k
N ,
ℓ ∈ Tk
(2.24)
has a solution (X˜k, Z˜k), as the backward state Z˜k does not appear in the forward S∆E. Comparing
the forward S∆E of (2.24) (by substituting u˜t,x) with (2.23), we have
X˜kℓ = X˜
t,x
ℓ , ℓ ∈ Tk.
To apply Theorem 2.4, we validate the stationary condition. Noting Z˜kN = GN X˜
k
N , we have
Z˜kN−1 =
(
ATN−1Pk,NAN−1 + C
T
N−1Pk,NCN−1 +Qk,N−1
)
X˜kN−1
+
(
ATN−1Pk,NBN−1 + C
T
N−1Pk,NDN−1
)
u˜
t,x
N−1
=
(
ATN−1Pk,NAN−1 + C
T
N−1Pk,NCN−1 +Qk,N−1 −H
T
k,N−1W
†
N−1,N−1HN−1,N−1
)
X˜kN−1
= Pk,N−1X˜
k
N−1. (2.25)
By some backward induction, we get
Z˜kℓ = Pk,ℓX˜
k
ℓ , ℓ ∈ Tk, k ∈ Tt,
which implies
Rk,ku˜
t,x
k +B
T
k E(Z˜
k
k+1|Fk−1) +D
T
k E(Z˜
k
k+1wk|Fk−1)
=
(
Rk,k +B
T
k Pk,k+1Bk +D
T
k Pk,k+1Dk
)
u˜
t,x
k +
(
BTk Pk,k+1Ak +D
T
k Pk,k+1Ck
)
X˜
t,x
k
=Wk,ku˜
t,x
k +Hk,kX˜
t,x
k
= 0.
The last equality follows from the solvability of (2.17). Therefore, the stationary condition holds.
Furthermore, corresponding to (2.12) and (2.16), let
Yℓ+1 = AℓYℓ + CℓYℓwℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk+1,
Yk+1 = Bku¯k +Dku¯kwk,
Yk = 0.
Then, by some simple calculations, we have for any u¯k ∈ L2F(k;R
m)
E
[
u¯TkRk,ku¯k
]
+ E
[
(Y )TNGkYN
]
+
N−1∑
ℓ=k
E
[
(Yℓ)
TQk,ℓYℓ
]
=
N−1∑
ℓ=k
E
[
(Yℓ+1)
TSk,ℓ+1Yℓ+1 − (Yℓ)
T (Sk,ℓ −Qk,ℓ)Yℓ
]
+ E
[
u¯TkRk,ku¯k
]
= E
[
u¯Tk
(
Rk,k +B
T
k Sk,k+1Bk +D
T
k Sk,k+1Dk
)
u¯k
]
≥ 0, (2.26)
where the inequality is from the solvability of (2.18). Therefore, the convexity condition holds. By
Theorem 2.4, the pair (X˜t,x, u˜t,x) given in (2.22)-(2.23) is an open-loop equilibrium pair of Problem
(LQ) for (2.16), (2.3) and (t, x).
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(i)⇒(ii). For any given initial pair (t, x) ∈ T× Rn, let (Xt,x,∗, ut,x,∗) be an open-loop equilibrium
pair of Problem (LQ) corresponding to (2.16) and (2.3). In this case, for any k ∈ Tt, (2.9) (2.10)
become 
X
t,x,∗
ℓ+1 = AℓX
t,x,∗
ℓ +Bℓu
t,x,∗
ℓ +
(
CℓX
t,x,∗
ℓ +Dℓu
t,x,∗
ℓ
)
wℓ,
Z
k,∗
ℓ = Qk,ℓX
t,x,∗
k +A
T
ℓ E(Z
k,∗
ℓ+1|Fℓ−1) + C
T
ℓ E(Z
k,∗
ℓ+1wℓ|Fℓ−1),
X
t,x,∗
k = X
t,x,∗
k , Z
k,∗
N = GkX
t,x,∗
N ,
ℓ ∈ Tk,
(2.27)
and
0 = Rk,ku
t,x,∗
k +B
T
k E(Z
k,∗
k+1|Fk−1) +D
T
k E(Z
k,∗
k+1wk|Fk−1). (2.28)
Letting t = N − 1, we have from (2.27) and (2.28)
0 = RN−1,N−1u
N−1,x,∗
N−1 +B
T
N−1E(Z
N−1,∗
N |FN−2) +D
T
N−1E(Z
N−1,∗
N wN−1|FN−2)
=
(
RN−1,N−1 +B
T
N−1GN−1BN−1 +D
T
N−1GN−1DN−1
)
u
N−1,x,∗
N−1
+
(
BTN−1GN−1AN−1 +D
T
N−1GN−1CN−1
)
X
N−1,x,∗
N−1
,WN−1,N−1u
N−1,x,∗
N−1 +HN−1,N−1X
N−1,x,∗
N−1 , (2.29)
where WN−1,N−1, HN−1,N−1 are defined in (2.19) with PN−1,N = GN−1. As x in (2.29) can be taken
arbitrarily, we have from Lemma 2.5
WN−1,N−1W
†
N−1,N−1HN−1,N−1 −HN−1,N−1 = 0, (2.30)
and
u
N−1,x,∗
N−1 = −W
†
N−1,N−1HN−1,N−1x.
Assume that we have derived the GDREs over the time period Tt+1 = {t+ 1, ..., N − 1}, namely,

Pk,ℓ = Qk,ℓ +A
T
ℓ Pk,ℓ+1Aℓ + C
T
ℓ Pk,ℓ+1Cℓ −H
T
k,ℓW
†
ℓ,ℓHℓ,ℓ,
Pk,N = Gk,
ℓ ∈ Tk,
Wk,kW
†
k,kHk,k −Hk,k = 0,
k ∈ Tt+1
(2.31)
is solvable. To prove the solvability of the GDREs over Tt, it is necessary to prove that the GDRE
associated with t

Pt,k = Qt,k +A
T
k Pt,k+1Ak + C
T
k Pt,k+1Ck −H
T
t,kW
†
k,kHk,k,
Pt,N = Gt,
k ∈ Tt,
Wt,tW
†
t,tHt,t −Ht,t = 0
(2.32)
is solvable. Let x ∈ Rn and consider Problem (LQ) corresponding to (2.16), (2.3) and the initial pair
(t, x). Similarly to (2.29), we have for k = N − 1
0 =WN−1,N−1u
t,x,∗
N−1 +HN−1,N−1X
t,x,∗
N−1, (2.33)
which together with the solvability of (2.31) implies
u
t,x,∗
N−1 = −W
†
N−1,N−1HN−1,N−1X
t,x,∗
N−1. (2.34)
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Similar to (2.25), we have
Z
N−2,∗
N−1 =
(
ATN−1GN−2AN−1 + C
T
N−1GN−2CN−1 +QN−2,N−1
−HTN−2,N−1W
†
N−1,N−1HN−1,N−1
)
X
t,x,∗
N−1
= PN−2,N−1X
t,x,∗
N−1. (2.35)
Furthermore, from (2.27) and (2.28) we have
0 = RN−2,N−2u
t,x,∗
N−2 +B
T
N−2E(Z
N−2,∗
N−1 |FN−3) +D
T
N−2E(Z
N−2,∗
N−1 wN−2|FN−3)
=
(
RN−2,N−2 +B
T
N−2PN−2,N−1BN−2 +D
T
N−2PN−2,N−1DN−2
)
u
t,x,∗
N−2
+
(
BTN−2PN−2,N−1AN−2 +D
T
N−2PN−2,N−1CN−2
)
X
t,x,∗
N−2
=WN−2,N−2u
t,x,∗
N−2 +HN−2,N−2X
t,x,∗
N−2.
By the solvability of (2.31) and Lemma 2.5, we have
u
t,x,∗
N−2 = −W
†
N−2,N−2HN−2,N−2X
t,x,∗
N−2. (2.36)
Furthermore,
Z
N−3,∗
N−1 =
{
QN−3,N−1 +A
T
N−1GN−3AN−1 + C
T
N−1GN−3CN−1
−HTN−3,N−1W
†
N−1,N−1HN−1,N−1
}
X
t,x,∗
N−1
= PN−3,N−1X
t,x,∗
N−1, (2.37)
and
Z
N−3,∗
N−2 = QN−3,N−2X
t,x,∗
N−2 +A
T
N−2E
(
Z
N−3,∗
N−1 |FN−3
)
+ CTN−2E
(
Z
N−3,∗
N−1 wN−2|FN−3
)
=
(
QN−3,N−2 +A
T
N−2PN−3,N−1AN−2 + C
T
N−2PN−3,N−1CN−1
)
X
t,x,∗
N−2
+
(
ATN−2PN−3,N−1BN−2 + C
T
N−2PN−3,N−1DN−2
)
u
t,x,∗
N−2
=
(
QN−3,N−2 +A
T
N−2PN−3,N−1AN−2 + C
T
N−2PN−3,N−1CN−1
−HTN−3,N−2W
†
N−2,N−2HN−2,N−2
)
X
t,x,∗
N−2
= PN−3,N−2X
t,x,∗
N−2. (2.38)
From (2.34)-(2.38), we have the following deduction

u
t,x,∗
ℓ = −W
†
ℓ,ℓHℓ,ℓX
t,x,∗
ℓ ,
Z
k−1,∗
ℓ = Pk−1,ℓX
t,x,∗
ℓ ,
ℓ ∈ Tk,
k ∈ Tt+1.
(2.39)
To extend (2.39) to the case of including k = t, we have from (2.27) and (2.28)
0 = Rt,tu
t,x,∗
t +B
T
t E(Z
t,∗
t+1|Ft−1) +D
T
t E(Z
t,∗
t+1wt|Ft−1)
=
(
Rt,t +B
T
t Pt,t+1Bt +D
T
t Pt,t+1Dt
)
u
t,x,∗
t +
(
BTt Pt,t+1At +D
T
t Pt,t+1Ct
)
x
=Wt,tu
t,x,∗
t +Ht,tx.
As x can be arbitrarily taken, from Lemma 2.5 we have
Wt,tW
†
t,tHt,t −Ht,t = 0, (2.40)
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and
u
t,x,∗
t = −W
†
t,tHt,tx.
By (2.40), the GDRE (2.32) associated with t is solvable. Thus, GDREs over Tt are solvable. By the
method of induction, we have the solvability of the set of GDREs (2.17).
To conclude the proof, we need to show the solvability of (2.18). From (2.11) and similar to (2.26),
we have
0 ≤ inf
u¯k∈L
2
F
(k;Rm)
E
[
u¯Tk
(
Rk,k +B
T
k Sk,k+1Bk +D
T
k Sk,k+1Dk
)
u¯k
]
, k ∈ T.
Hence,
Rk,k +B
T
k Sk,k+1Bk +D
T
k Sk,k+1Dk ≥ 0, k ∈ T,
and (2.18) is solvable. 
Remark 2.7. In (2.17), the GDREs are coupled via {W †k,kHk,k, k ∈ T}. As for k 6= t Hk,k is
generally not equal to Ht,k, Pt,k, k ∈ Tt, t ∈ T, are nonsymmetric. On the contrary, the LDEs in (2.18)
are decoupled. Hence, St,k, k ∈ Tt, t ∈ T, are all symmetric as Gt, t ∈ T, are symmetric. Interestingly,
there is no definite constraint on matrices associated with (2.17), while the definite constraint is posed
through (2.18). This is different from the standard indefinite stochastic LQ optimal control. Concerned
with the reasons, the definite constraints in (2.18) are equivalent to the convexity conditions, while the
constraints in (2.17) are associated with the stationary conditions.
Let us further assume that Gt and Qt,k(k ∈ Tt) are all independent of t. Then, (2.17) and (2.18)
become 
Pk = Qk +A
T
k Pk+1Ak + C
T
k Pk+1Ck −H
T
k W
†
kHk,
PN = G,
WkW
†
kHk −Hk = 0,
k ∈ T,
(2.41)
and 
Sk = Qk +A
T
k Sk+1Ak + C
T
k Sk+1Ck,
SN = G,
Rk,k +B
T
k Sk+1Bk +D
T
k Sk+1Dk ≥ 0,
k ∈ T,
(2.42)
where 
Wk = Rk,k + B
T
k Pk+1Bk +D
T
k Pk+1Dk,
Hk = B
T
k Pk+1Ak +D
T
k Pk+1Ck,
k ∈ T.
In this case, Pk, k ∈ T, are all symmetric. Review the standard GDRE [1]
Pk = Qk +A
T
k Pk+1Ak + C
T
k Pk+1Ck −H
T
k W
†
kHk,
PN = G,
WkW
†
kHk −Hk = 0,
Wk ≥ 0,
k ∈ T.
(2.43)
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Though the GDRE (2.41) and the LDE (2.42) are different from the GDRE (2.43), we claim that
(2.41) and (2.42) are both solvable for the case with Qk ≥ 0, G ≥ 0 and Rk,k ≥ 0, k ∈ T. However, the
condition that ensure the solvability of (2.17) is hard to obtain (even for the definite case) due to its
nonsymmetric structure. At the present time, we therefore need to validate the solvability of (2.17)
case by case. In the future, we shall study the condition that ensure the solvability of (2.17), and focus
on more general cases other than the case of (2.16).
3 Linear feedback time-consistent equilibrium strategy
In this section, we investigate a kind of closed-loop equilibrium solution, which focuses on the time-
consistency of the strategy. Here, a strategy means a decision rule that a controller uses to select her
control action, based on available information set. Mathematically, a strategy is a measurable mapping
on the information set. When we substitute the available information into a strategy, the open-loop
realization or open-loop value of this strategy is obtained.
Definition 3.1. Φ = {Φ0, · · · ,ΦN−1} with Φt ∈ Rm×n, t ∈ T, is called a linear feedback equilibrium
strategy of Problem (LQ), if the following inequality holds for any initial pair (t, x) ∈ T× Rn, k ∈ Tt
and uk ∈ L2F(k;R
m)
J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (ΦX
k,Φ)|Tk
)
≤ J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (uk, (ΦX
k,uk,Φ)|Tk+1)
)
. (3.1)
Here, Xt,x,∗ = {Xt,x,∗k , k ∈ T˜t}, X
k,Φ = {Xk,Φℓ , ℓ ∈ T˜k} and X
k,uk,Φ = {Xk,uk,Φℓ , ℓ ∈ T˜k} are given,
respectively, by{
X
t,x,∗
k+1 =
(
Ak,k +Bk,kΦk
)
X
t,x,∗
k +
(
Ck,k +Dk,kΦk
)
X
t,x,∗
k wk,
X
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt,
(3.2){
X
k,Φ
ℓ+1 =
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)
X
k,Φ
ℓ +
(
Ck,ℓ +Dk,ℓΦℓ
)
X
k,Φ
ℓ wℓ,
X
k,Φ
k = X
t,x,∗
k , ℓ ∈ Tk,
(3.3)

X
k,uk,Φ
ℓ+1 =
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)
X
k,uk,Φ
ℓ +
(
Ck,ℓ +Dk,ℓΦℓ
)
X
k,uk,Φ
ℓ wℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk+1,
X
k,uk,Φ
k+1 = Ak,kX
k,uk,Φ
k +Bk,kuk +
(
Ck,kX
k,uk,Φ
k +Dk,kuk
)
wk,
X
k,uk,Φ
k = X
t,x,∗
k
(3.4)
with
(ΦXk,Φ)|Tk =
(
ΦkX
k,Φ
k , · · · ,ΦN−1X
k,Φ
N−1
)
,
(ΦXk,uk,Φ)|Tk+1 =
(
Φk+1X
k,ut,Φ
k+1 , · · · ,ΦN−1X
k,uk,Φ
N−1
)
.
From Definition 3.1, we know that Φ|Tt (the restriction of Φ on Tt) is a linear feedback equilibrium
strategy. Hence, Φ is time-consistent. The following theorem is concerned with the existence of linear
feedback equilibrium strategy, which is parallel to Theorem 2.4.
Theorem 3.2. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) There exists a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ).
(ii) There exists a Φ = {Φ0, · · · ,ΦN−1} with Φt ∈ Rm×n, t ∈ T, such that for any initial pair
(t, x) ∈ T× Rn and k ∈ Tt, the following FBS∆E has a solution (X
k,Φ, Zk,Φ)
X
k,Φ
ℓ+1 =
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)
X
k,Φ
ℓ +
(
Ck,ℓ +Dk,ℓΦℓ
)
X
k,Φ
ℓ wℓ,
Z
k,Φ
ℓ =
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
E(Zk,Φℓ+1|Fℓ−1) +
(
Ck,ℓ +Dk,ℓΦℓ
)T
E(Zk,Φℓ+1wℓ|Fℓ−1)
+
(
ΦTℓ Rk,ℓΦℓ +Qk,ℓ
)
X
k,Φ
ℓ ,
X
k,Φ
k = X
t,x,∗
k , Z
k,Φ
N = GkX
k,Φ
N , ℓ ∈ Tk
(3.5)
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with the stationary condition
0 = Rk,kΦkX
k,Φ
k +B
T
k,kE(Z
k,Φ
k+1|Fk−1) +D
T
k,kE(Z
k,Φ
k+1wk|Fk−1), k ∈ Tt, (3.6)
and the convexity condition
inf
u¯k∈L
2
F
(k;Rm)
{
E
[
u¯TkRk,ku¯k
]
+
N−1∑
ℓ=k
E
[
(Y k,u¯k,Φℓ )
T
(
Qk,ℓ +Φ
T
ℓ Rk,ℓΦℓ
)
Y
k,u¯k,Φ
ℓ
]
+ E
[
(Y k,u¯k,ΦN )
TGkY
k,u¯k,Φ
N
]}
≥ 0. (3.7)
In (3.5) (3.7), Xt,x,∗, Y k,u¯k,Φ are given by (3.2) and
Y
k,u¯k,Φ
ℓ+1 =
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)
Y
k,u¯k,Φ
ℓ +
(
Ck,ℓ +Dk,ℓΦℓ
)
Y
k,u¯k,Φ
ℓ wℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk+1,
Y
k,u¯k,Φ
k+1 = Bk,ku¯k +Dk,ku¯kwk,
Y
k,u¯k,Φ
k = 0.
(3.8)
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Based on Theorem 3.2, the relationship between the existence of linear feedback equilibrium strategy
and the solvability of a set of difference equations is established. It is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) Problem (LQ) admits a linear feedback equilibrium strategy.
(ii) The following set of equations

P˜t,k = Qt,k +Φ
T
kRt,kΦk + (At,k +Bt,kΦk)
T P˜t,k+1(At,k +Bt,kΦk)
+ (Ct,k +Dt,kΦk)
T P˜t,k+1(Ct,k +Dt,kΦk)
P˜t,N = Gt,
k ∈ Tt,
W˜t,tW˜
†
t,tH˜t,t − H˜t,t = 0,
W˜t,t ≥ 0,
t ∈ T
(3.9)
is solvable in the sense that the constrained conditions W˜t,tW˜
†
t,tH˜t,t − H˜t,t = 0 and W˜t,t ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ T,
are satisfied. Here, 
W˜t,t = Rt,t +B
T
t,tP˜t,t+1Bt,t +D
T
t,tP˜t,t+1Dt,t,
H˜t,t = B
T
t,tP˜t,t+1At,t +D
T
t,tP˜t,t+1Ct,t,
Φt = −W˜
†
t,tH˜t,t,
t ∈ T.
(3.10)
Under any of above conditions, Φ given in (3.10) is a linear feedback equilibrium strategy.
Proof. (i)⇒(ii). Let Φ be a linear feedback equilibrium strategy. Then, for any initial pair (t, x),
(3.5) admits a solution. Let k = t in (3.5) and (3.6); noting Zt,ΦN = GtX
t,Φ
N and by results in [17], one
can get
Z
t,Φ
k = P˜t,kX
t,Φ
k , k ∈ Tt, (3.11)
where P˜t,k, k ∈ Tt, are deterministic matrices and determined below. Then, from (3.6) and Lemma
2.5, we have
0 = Rt,tΦtX
t,Φ
t +B
T
t,tE(P˜t,t+1X
t,Φ
t+1|Ft−1) +D
T
t,tE(P˜t,t+1X
t,Φ
t+1wt|Ft−1)
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=
[
Rt,tΦt +B
T
t,tP˜t,t+1(At,t +Bt,tΦt) +D
T
t,tP˜t,t+1(Ct,t +Dt,tΦt)
]
X
t,Φ
t .
As x = Xt,Φt can be arbitrarily selected, we have
0 = Rt,tΦt +B
T
t,tP˜t,t+1(At,t +Bt,tΦt) +D
T
t,tP˜t,t+1(Ct,t +Dt,tΦt).
From Lemma 2.5, it follows that
Φt = −W˜
†
t,tH˜t,t,
and
W˜t,tW˜
†
t,tH˜t,t − H˜t,t = 0.
Note that
Z
t,Φ
k =
{
Qt,k +Φ
T
kRt,kΦk + (At,k +Bt,kΦk)
T P˜t,k+1(At,k +Bt,kΦk)
+ (Ct,k +Dt,kΦk)
T P˜t,k+1(Ct,k +Dt,kΦk)
}
X
t,Φ
k .
For k ∈ Tt, let
P˜t,k = Qt,k +Φ
T
kRt,kΦk + (At,k +Bt,kΦk)
T P˜t,k+1(At,k +Bt,kΦk)
+ (Ct,k +Dt,kΦk)
T P˜t,k+1(Ct,k +Dt,kΦk).
Then, (3.11) holds. Furthermore, by the convexity condition (3.7), we have for any u¯t ∈ L
2
F(t;R
m)
0 ≤ E
[
u¯Tt Rt,tu¯t
]
+ E
[
(Y t,u¯t,ΦN )
T P˜t,NY
t,u¯t,Φ
N
]
+
N−1∑
ℓ=t
E
[
(Y t,u¯t,Φk )
T
(
Qt,k +Φ
T
kRt,kΦk
)
Y
t,u¯t,Φ
k
]
= E
[
u¯Tt
(
Rt,t +B
T
t,tP˜t,t+1Bt,t +D
T
t,tP˜t,t+1Dt,t
)
u¯t
]
.
Hence,
W˜t,t = Rt,t +B
T
t,tP˜t,t+1Bt,t +D
T
t,tP˜t,t+1Dt,t ≥ 0.
When t ranges from N − 1 to 0, we have the solvability of (3.9).
(ii)⇒(i). Note that Φ = {Φ0, ...,ΦN−1} with Φt = −W˜
†
t,tH˜t,t, t ∈ T. As (3.9) is solvable, FBS∆E
(3.5) is solvable with property (3.11). Furthermore, by reversing some presentations in “(i)⇒(ii)”, the
stationary condition (3.6) and the convexity condition (3.7) are both satisfied. Therefore, Φ is a linear
feedback equilibrium strategy. 
Substituting Φ into (3.9), one get

P˜t,k = Qt,k +A
T
t,kP˜t,k+1At,k + C
T
t,kP˜t,k+1Ct,k − H˜
T
k,kW˜
†
k,kH˜t,k
− H˜Tt,kW˜
†
k,kH˜k,k + H˜
T
k,kW˜
†
k,kW˜t,kW˜
†
k,kH˜k,k
P˜t,N = Gt,
k ∈ Tt,
W˜t,tW˜
†
t,tH˜t,t − H˜t,t = 0,
W˜t,t ≥ 0,
t ∈ T,
(3.12)
where 
W˜t,k = Rt,k +B
T
t,kP˜t,k+1Bt,k +D
T
t,kP˜t,k+1Dt,k,
H˜t,k = B
T
t,kP˜t,k+1At,k +D
T
t,kP˜t,k+1Ct,k,
k ∈ Tt, t ∈ T.
For any t ∈ T, k ∈ Tt, P˜t,k is symmetric. Furthermore, if Qt,k ≥ 0, Rt,k > 0, Gt ≥ 0, k ∈ Tt, t ∈ T,
then we can prove that W˜t,k > 0 and P˜t,k ≥ 0, k ∈ Tt, t ∈ T. Therefore, (3.12) is solvable.
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Corollary 3.4. If Qt,k ≥ 0, Rt,k > 0, Gt ≥ 0, k ∈ Tt, t ∈ T, then Problem (LQ) admits a unique
linear feedback equilibrium strategy Φ.
For the case where At,k, Bt,k, Ct,k, Dt,k, Qt,k, k ∈ Tt, Gt, are all independent of t, (3.12) reads as

P˜t,k = Qk +A
T
k P˜t,k+1Ak + C
T
k P˜t,k+1Ck − H˜
T
k,kW˜
†
k,kH˜t,k
− H˜Tt,kW˜
†
k,kH˜k,k + H˜
T
k,kW˜
†
k,kW˜t,kW˜
†
k,kH˜k,k
P˜t,N = G,
k ∈ Tt,
W˜t,tW˜
†
t,tH˜t,t − H˜t,t = 0,
W˜t,t ≥ 0,
t ∈ T,
(3.13)
where 
W˜t,k = Rt,k +B
T
k P˜t,k+1Bk +D
T
k P˜t,k+1Dk,
H˜t,k = B
T
k P˜t,k+1Ak +D
T
k P˜t,k+1Ck,
k ∈ Tt, t ∈ T.
Here, (3.13) is different from (2.41) and (2.42), which relates to the open-loop equilibrium control of the
corresponding situation. Moreover, when all the system matrices in the dynamics and cost functional
are independent of the initial time, (3.12) will reduce to the standard GDRE [1].
4 Comparison
For the time-inconsistent stochastic LQ problem, open-loop and closed-loop time-consistent solutions
are separately investigated in the above two sections. Section 2 is concerned with the open-loop
equilibrium control, while the linear feedback equilibrium strategy is studied in Section 3 that is a kind
of closed-loop strategy. As noted in Introduction, the objects of study in these two formulations are
quite different. Open-loop time-consistent solution is to find an open-loop control that is an equilibrium
of a leader-follower game with hierarchical structure. Open-loop control, or simply control, or more
exactly control action, in this paper is referred to as a function of time that is also adapted to a filtration;
such a meaning of open-loop control is adopted by many scholars in their works (for example, [3] [23]).
Generated by some primitive random variables, the filtration is viewed as the “state of nature”, and
the adaptedness to such a filtration is to emphasize that the underlining open-loop control is allowed
to be random. Note that the key point of above comment is not to the attribute “open-loop” but to
the subject “control”.
So far, time-consistent (linear feedback) strategy is the object of closed-loop formulation. A strategy
is a decision rule that a controller uses to select his control action based on the available information
set. Mathematically, strategy is a mapping or operator on some information set, which is a higher-rank
notion other than control. When substituting the available information into a strategy, the open-loop
value or open-loop realization of this strategy is then obtained. To get more about this, let us look
at the strategy Φ in the definition of linear feedback equilibrium strategy, which can be viewed as a
binary mapping Φ(·, ·). When substituting the information (k,Xt,x,∗k ), we have the open-loop value
Φ(k,Xt,x,∗k ) = ΦkX
t,x,∗
k at time point k. Similarly, (ΦX
k,Φ)|Tk = (Φ(k,X
k,Φ
k ), ...,Φ(N − 1, X
k,Φ
N−1)) is
an open-loop value of Φ on the time period Tk, which is a control action on Tk.
Besides above conceptual difference between control and strategy, let us further compare the def-
initions of the two equilibria. In the definition of open-loop equilibrium control, state involved in
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J(k,Xt,x,∗k ; (uk, u
t,x,∗|Tk+1)) of (2.5) satisfies the following equations
X
k,uk,u
t,x,∗
ℓ+1 = Ak,ℓX
k,uk,u
t,x,∗
ℓ +Bk,ℓu
t,x,∗
ℓ +
(
Ck,ℓX
k,uk,u
t,x,∗
ℓ +Dk,ℓu
t,x,∗
ℓ
)
wℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk+1,
X
k,uk,u
t,x,∗
k+1 = Ak,kX
k,uk,u
t,x,∗
k +Bk,kuk +
(
Ck,kX
k,uk,u
t,x,∗
k +Dk,kuk
)
wk,
X
k,uk,u
t,x,∗
k = X
t,x,∗
k .
(4.1)
In (4.1), ut,x,∗|Tk+1 is not influenced by uk, because it is given prior. On the contrary, in the definition
of linear feedback equilibrium strategy, the control (ΦXk,uk,Φ)|Tk+1 in (3.4) is influenced by uk via
the term Xk,uk,Φ. This makes an essential difference between the open-loop equilibrium control and
the linear feedback equilibrium strategy. In addition, an open-loop equilibrium control when being
mentioned is corresponding to a fixed initial pair, while the linear feedback equilibrium strategy is
required to define for all the initial pairs.
Moreover, the existence of open-loop equilibrium control and linear feedback equilibrium strategy
is differently characterized. The fact that there exists an open-loop equilibrium control for any given
initial pair, is fully characterized via the solvability of a set of nonsymmetric GDREs and the solvabil-
ity of a set of LDEs. In contrast, the existence of linear feedback equilibrium strategy is shown to be
equivalent to the solvability of a single set of GDREs, which are symmetric. Note that just Rk,k, k ∈ T,
are involved in (2.17) and (2.18). Hence, if some Rt,k, k ∈ Tt+1, t ∈ T, are modified, the existence of
open-loop equilibrium control will not change! The reason of this lies in the definition of open-loop equi-
librium control. Specifically, given initial pair (t, x) and by subtracting
∑N−1
ℓ=k+1 E
[
(ut,x,∗ℓ )
TRk,ℓu
t,x,∗
ℓ
]
from both sides of (2.5), (2.5) can be equivalently rewritten as
E
[N−1∑
ℓ=k
(Xk,u
t,x,∗
ℓ )
TQk,ℓX
k,ut,x,∗
ℓ
]
+ E
[
(ut,x,∗k )
TRk,ku
t,x,∗
k
]
+ E
[
(Xk,u
t,x,∗
N )
TGkX
k,ut,x,∗
N
]
≤ E
[N−1∑
ℓ=k
(Xk,uk,u
t,x,∗
ℓ )
TQk,ℓX
k,uk,u
t,x,∗
ℓ
]
+ E
[
uTkRk,kuk
]
+ E
[
(Xk,uk,u
t,x,∗
N )
TGkX
k,uk,u
t,x,∗
N
]
, (4.2)
where Xk,u
t,x,∗
and Xk,uk,u
t,x,∗
are given, respectively, by{
X
k,ut,x,∗
ℓ+1 = Ak,ℓX
k,ut,x,∗
ℓ +Bk,ℓu
t,x,∗
ℓ +
(
Ck,ℓX
k,ut,x,∗
ℓ +Dk,ℓu
t,x,∗
ℓ
)
wℓ,
X
k,ut,x,∗
k = X
t,x,∗
k , ℓ ∈ Tk+1,
(4.3)
and (4.1). Note that Rk,ℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk+1, k ∈ T, do not appear in (4.2). This could explain why only
Rk,k, k ∈ T, are involved in (2.17) and (2.18). Otherwise, in the definition of linear feedback equilib-
rium strategy, (ΦXk,Φ)|Tk+1 and (ΦX
k,uk,Φ)|Tk+1 of (3.1) are different as X
k,Φ differs from Xk,uk,Φ.
Therefore, terms in (3.1) associated with Rk,ℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk+1, cannot be removed, which implies the depen-
dence of (3.12) on Rk,ℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk+1, k ∈ T.
Furthermore, let us pay attention to the computations of these two equilibria. As noted above, when
we mention an open-loop equilibrium control, the initial pair which induces that open-loop equilibrium
control should be mentioned simultaneously. Differently, the linear feedback equilibrium strategy is
independent of all the initial pairs. These facts will help us to differentiate the backward procedures
(mentioned below) of computing an open-loop equilibrium control and the linear feedback equilibrium
strategy. Theorem 2.4 and Theorem 3.2 are generally the maximum-principle-type equivalent charac-
terizations, and the backward S∆Es are involved. To obtain an open-loop equilibrium control ut,x,∗, we
should decouple the FBS∆Es (for every k we have a (2.9)) along the equilibrium state Xt,x,∗. Roughly
speaking, from the stationary condition, we have ut,x,∗N−1 by decoupling FBS∆E (2.9) (with k = N − 1).
Generally, based on all the expressions of ut,x,∗ℓ , ℓ ∈ Tk+1, we should redecouple the FBS∆E (2.9)
on the whole time period Tk to obtain the linear relation between Z
k,∗ and Xk,∗, and then by the
stationary condition we can get ut,x,∗k . Note that via its forward initial state X
t,x,∗
k , the FBS∆Es are
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coupled with the equilibrium state Xt,x,∗, and the equilibrium control and the equilibrium state are
obtained simultaneously.
Concerned with the linear feedback equilibrium strategy, if exists, it can be calculated via solving
the GDREs (3.12) backwardly. For every generic time point t, we need to solve a single GDRE
(associated with t) over the whole time period Tt, and use the solution P˜t,t+1 at time point t + 1 to
construct Φt = W˜
†
t,tH˜t,t. This backward procedure is also due to a decoupling procedure of FBS∆Es
(3.5). It should be mention that only under the condition of the existence of linear feedback equilibrium
strategy, this strategy can be computed backwardly as above. Furthermore, necessary and sufficient
conditions on the existence of the equilibria are the main concerns of this paper, from which the
computations of the equilibria are much direct.
To end this section, we give the following final comment. Under the condition that there exists an
open-loop equilibrium control for any given initial pair, all the open-loop equilibrium controls happen
to be of feedback form; while the feedback gain {−W †k,kHk,k, k ∈ T} in (2.20) is not a linear feedback
equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ) indeed!
5 Examples
In this section, we shall present three examples to illustrate the theory derived above.
Example 5.1. Let
A0 =
[
1.12 0.21
−0.13 0.98
]
, A1 =
[
2.12 −0.35
−0.21 3.43
]
, A2 =
[
5.46 1.21
−0.98 4.21
]
,
B0 =
[
1.45 −0.23
−0.2 4
]
, B1 =
[
1.5 0.3
−0.2 3
]
, B2 =
[
−4.36 0.82
1.21 4.21
]
,
C0 =
[
1 0.32
0.25 3
]
, C1 =
[
1.65 −0.13
−0.42 6
]
, C2 =
[
−3 1.53
−0.62 4.78
]
,
D0 =
[
5 1
−0.85 8
]
, D1 =
[
4 0.53
−0.42 5
]
, D2 =
[
9.21 −2.03
−1.52 6.98
]
,
Q0 =
[
−2 0.8
0.8 1.6
]
, Q1 =
[
4 0
0 0
]
, Q2 =
[
1.56 −0.23
−0.23 2.54
]
, R0,0 =
[
−0.5 0
0 1
]
,
R0,1 =
[
−5 0
0 −4
]
, R0,2 =
[
−9 0
0 10
]
, R1,1 =
[
4 −0.3
−0.3 7
]
,
R1,2 =
[
2.24 −5.67
−5.67 −1.27
]
, R2,2 =
[
6.29 −1.67
−1.67 8.38
]
, G =
[
1 0
0 2
]
.
Here, Q1 ≥ 0, Q2, G,R1,1, R2,2 > 0; Q0, R0,0 and R1,2 are indefinite, and R0,1 is negative definite.
By (2.41) and (2.42), we get
P2 =
[
16.6571 5.8520
5.8520 11.5436
]
, P1 =
[
6.9700 −1.3882
−1.3882 9.1396
]
, P0 =
[
7.8991 4.2276
4.2276 4.6336
]
,
S2 =
[
43.0612 −12.3922
−12.3922 87.4900
]
, S1 =
[
11.6579 −7.4371
−7.4371 95.6692
]
, S0 =
[
34.3248 35.9699
35.9699 938.8710
]
with
W2 =
[
117.6727 −34.9725
−34.9725 146.0623
]
> 0, W1 =
[
287.3160 153.0623
153.0623 447.2115
]
> 0, (5.1)
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W0 =
[
1138.3 −410.9
−410.9 915.8
]
> 0, (5.2)
R2,2 +B
T
2 S3B2 +D
T
2 S3D2 =
[
117.6727 −34.9725
−34.9725 146.0623
]
> 0, (5.3)
R1,1 +B
T
1 S2B1 +D
T
1 S2D1 =
[
857.9 −426.0
−426.0 2909.6
]
> 0, (5.4)
R0,0 +B
T
0 S1B0 +D
T
0 S1D0 =
[
17940 −54740
−54740 331470
]
> 0. (5.5)
From (5.1)-(5.5), the corresponding (2.41) and (2.42) are solvable, and thus, the open-loop equilibrium
pair exists. Furthermore, an open-loop equilibrium control for the initial pair (0, x) is given by
u
0,x,∗
k = −W
†
kHkX
0,x,∗
k , k = 0, 1, 2
with
−W †0H0 =
[
−0.2183 0.0031
0.0023 −0.3286
]
, −W †1H1 =
[
−0.5138 0.1973
0.0026 −1.1339
]
,
−W †2H2 =
[
0.4889 −0.2601
0.1605 −0.7474
]
and 
X
0,x,∗
k+1 = (AkX
0,x,∗
k +Bku
0,x,∗
k )
+ (CkX
0,x,∗
k +Dku
0,x,∗
k )wk,
X
0,x,∗
0 = x, k = 0, 1, 2.
On the other hand, from (3.13) we can obtain the solution. However, we have
W˜1,1 =
[
239.0218 247.7565
247.7565 224.5117
]
,
whose eigenvalues are
λ1 = −16.096, λ2 = 479.6294.
Clearly, W˜1,1 is indefinite, and thus, the corresponding (3.13) is not solvable. This means that the
linear feedback equilibrium strategy does not exist.
Example 5.2. The system matrices and the weight matrices are the same as those of Example 5.1
except for R0,1, R0,2, R1,2, which are now
R0,1 =
[
−1 0
0 −0.6
]
, R0,2 =
[
9.45 1.32
1.32 10.78
]
, R1,2 =
[
5.24 −1.67
−1.67 7.27
]
.
Note that R0,1 is negative definite.
In this case, the corresponding (2.41) and (2.42) are the same as those of Example 5.1, because
R0,1, R0,2, R1,2 do not enter the GDRE and LDE. Hence, the open-loop equilibrium pair exists for any
initial pair. Let us check the existence of the linear feedback equilibrium strategy. By (3.13) we have
P˜2,2 =
[
16.6571 5.8520
5.8520 11.5436
]
, P˜1,2 =
[
16.3775 6.1187
6.1187 10.8526
]
, P˜1,1 =
[
37.3769 −10.7301
−10.7301 12.7823
]
,
P˜0,2 =
[
17.9435 3.9449
3.9449 14.2605
]
, P˜0,1 =
[
39.7057 −11.0096
−11.0096 3.2054
]
, P˜0,0 =
[
6.1615 4.3853
4.3853 3.2889
]
19
with
W˜2,2 =
[
117.6727 −34.9725
−34.9725 146.0623
]
> 0, W˜1,1 =
[
281.0078 160.6675
160.6675 425.5062
]
> 0, (5.6)
W˜0,0 =
[
1178.0 −334.5
−334.5 143.3
]
> 0. (5.7)
It follows from (5.6)-(5.7) that (3.13) is solvable. Furthermore, a linear feedback equilibrium strategy
(Φ0,Φ1,Φ2) is given by
Φ0 =
[
−0.0368 0.0884
0.6555 −0.0192
]
, Φ1 =
[
−0.5094 0.1935
−0.0021 −1.1301
]
, Φ2 =
[
0.4889 −0.2601
0.1605 −0.7474
]
.
Example 5.3. Let
A0,0 =
[
2.3 0.41
−0.3 1.9
]
, A0,1 =
[
4.12 −0.35
0.31 3.03
]
, B0,0 =
[
2.45 −0.3
0.2 4
]
,
B0,1 =
[
2.5 0.6
−0.2 3
]
, C0,0 =
[
2.2 0.32
0.5 3
]
, C0,1 =
[
3.65 −0.3
−0.42 5.6
]
,
D0,0 =
[
5.6 1
0.73 7.8
]
, D0,1 =
[
5 0.73
−0.47 5.2
]
, A1,1 =
[
6 1.63
−1.37 7
]
,
B1,1 =
[
4 0.93
1.07 3
]
, C1,1 =
[
8 2.03
−1.23 10
]
, D1,1 =
[
5 −0.93
1.016 4.65
]
,
Q0,0 =
[
2 0.8
0.8 1.6
]
, Q0,1 =
[
4 0
0 0
]
, R0,0 =
[
−0.5 0
0 1
]
, R0,1 =
[
−5 0
0 −4
]
,
Q1,1 =
[
2 0.1
0.1 5
]
, R1,1 =
[
4 −0.3
−0.3 7
]
, G0 =
[
1 0
0 2
]
, G1 =
[
2 −0.3
−0.3 3
]
.
Note that R0,0 is indefinite and R0,1 is negative definite.
By (3.12), we have
P˜1,1 =
[
18.8304 −11.9513
−11.9513 46.5418
]
, P˜0,1 =
[
40.6027 −28.7266
−28.7266 50.9647
]
, P˜0,0 =
[
99.6787 14.1112
14.1112 8.3265
]
with
W˜1,1 =
[
86.9155 11.0531
11.0531 103.2478
]
> 0, W˜0,0 =
[
1282.7 −1027.0
−1027.0 3582.2
]
> 0. (5.8)
It follows from (5.8) that the corresponding (3.12) is solvable. Hence, the linear feedback equilibrium
strategy does exist. Furthermore, a linear feedback equilibrium strategy (Φ0,Φ1) is given by
Φ0 =
[
−0.4665 −0.0206
0.0269 −0.3965
]
, Φ1 =
[
−1.4499 −0.4726
0.6369 −1.8700
]
.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the open-loop equilibrium control and the linear feedback equilibrium
strategy of the time-inconsistent indefinite stochastic LQ optimal control. Necessary and sufficient
conditions are presented for these two cases, respectively. Furthermore, the GDREs and LDEs are
introduced to characterize the linear feedback form of the open-loop equilibrium control and the linear
feedback equilibrium strategy. For future researches, we would like to study the time-inconsistent
problems for jump parameter systems [6], Boolean networks [12], multi-agent systems [20] etc., and
extend the methodology developed in this paper to other types of time-inconsistency.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Theorem 2.4
Denote J(k,Xt,x,∗k ; (uk, u
t,x,∗|Tk+1)) by J¯(k,X
t,x,∗
k ;uk). Then, by (2.5), we have
J¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;u
t,x,∗
k ) ≤ J¯(k,X
t,x,∗
k ;uk). (6.1)
This means that ut,x,∗k is an optimal control of the following nonstandard optimal control problem
(denoted as Problem (LQ)k):
Minimize J¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;uk) over L
2
F(k;R
m),
subject to
Xkℓ+1 = Ak,ℓX
k
ℓ +Bk,ℓu
t,x,∗
ℓ +
(
Ck,ℓX
k
ℓ +Dk,ℓu
t,x,∗
ℓ
)
wℓ,
Xkk+1 = (Ak,kX
k
k +Bk,kuk) + (Ck,kX
k
k +Dk,kuk)wk,
Xkk = X
t,x,∗
k , ℓ ∈ Tk+1.
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Here, we call Problem (LQ)k a non-standard optimal control problem as u
t,x,∗|Tk+1 in the dynamics
of Xk is fixed, and we just select uk to minimize J¯(k,X
t,x,∗
k ;uk).
To proceed, we introduce an inner product on L2F(Tk;R
p) with p = n,m, and k ∈ T˜t:
〈y, z〉Tk =
N−1∑
ℓ=k
E(yTℓ zℓ), for y, z ∈ L
2
F(Tk;R
p),
and use the convention {
(Qkx)(·) = Qk,·x·, ∀x ∈ L2F (Tk;R
n),
(Rk+u)(·) = Rk,·u·, ∀u ∈ L2F (Tk+1;R
m).
(6.2)
For L2F(k;R
p) with p = n,m, and k ∈ T˜t, the inner product is defined as
〈y, z〉k = E(y
T z), for y, z ∈ L2F (k;R
p).
Then, the cost functional J¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;uk) can be rewritten as
J¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;uk) = 〈QkX
k, Xk〉Tk + 〈Rk,kuk, uk〉k + 〈Rk+u
t,x,∗|Tk+1 , u
t,x,∗|Tk+1〉Tk+1
+ 〈GkX
k
N , X
k
N 〉N . (6.3)
We now calculate the first order and second order directional derivatives of J¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;uk) at u
t,x,∗
k .
Corresponding to controls ut,x,∗|Tk and (u
t,x,∗
k +λu¯k, u
t,x,∗|Tk+1), the solutions of (2.8) with the initial
state Xt,x,∗k are, respectively, denoted by X
k,∗ and Xk,λ. Then, we have
X
k,λ
ℓ+1
−X
k,∗
ℓ+1
λ
= Ak,ℓ
X
k,λ
ℓ
−X
k,∗
ℓ
λ
+ Ck,ℓ
X
k,λ
ℓ
−X
k,∗
ℓ
λ
wℓ,
X
k,λ
k+1
−X
k,∗
k+1
λ
=
(
Ak,k
X
k,λ
k
−X
k,∗
k
λ
+Bk,ku¯k
)
+
(
Ck,k
X
k,λ
k
−X
k,∗
k
λ
+Dk,ku¯k
)
wk,
X
k,λ
k
−X
k,∗
k
λ
= 0, ℓ ∈ Tk+1,
which can be rewritten as
Y kℓ+1 = Ak,ℓY
k
ℓ + Ck,ℓY
k
ℓ wℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk+1,
Y kk+1 = Bk,ku¯k +Dk,ku¯kwk,
Y kk = 0
(6.4)
with
X
k,λ
ℓ
−X
k,∗
ℓ
λ
= Y kℓ . For any ℓ ∈ Tk, we have X
k,λ
ℓ = X
k,∗
ℓ + λY
k
ℓ . To proceed, some calculations
show
lim
λ↓0
〈Rk,k(u
t,x,∗
k + λu¯k), u
t,x,∗
k + λu¯k〉k − 〈Rk,ku
t,x,∗
k , u
t,x,∗
k 〉k
λ
= 2〈Rk,ku
t,x,∗
k , u¯k〉k + lim
λ↓0
λ〈Rk,ku¯k, u¯k〉t
= 2〈Rk,ku
t,x,∗
k , u¯k〉k,
and
lim
λ↓0
〈QkXk,λ, Xk,λ〉Tk − 〈QkX
k,∗, Xk,∗〉Tk
λ
= 2〈QkX
k,∗, Y k〉Tk ,
lim
λ↓0
〈GkX
k,λ
N , X
k,λ
N 〉N − 〈GkX
k,∗
N , X
k,∗
N 〉N
λ
= 2〈GkX
k,∗
N , Y
k
N 〉N .
Hence, we have the first order directional derivative of J¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;uk) at u
t,x,∗
k with the direction u¯k
dJ¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;u
t,x,∗
k ; u¯k) = lim
λ↓0
J¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;u
t,x,∗
k + λu¯k)− J¯(k,X
t,x,∗
k ;u
t,x,∗
k )
λ
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= 2〈QkX
k,∗, Y k〉Tk + 2〈Rk,ku
t,x,∗
k , u¯k〉k + 2〈GkX
k,∗
N , Y
k
N 〉N . (6.5)
Similarly, the second order directional derivative with the direction (u¯k, uˆk) is given by
d2J¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;u
t,x,∗
k ; u¯k; uˆk) = lim
β↓0
dJ¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;u
t,x,∗
k + βuˆk; u¯k)− dJ¯(k,X
t,x,∗
k ;u
t,x,∗
k ; u¯k)
β
= 2〈QkYˆ
k, Y k〉Tk + 2〈Rk,kuˆk, u¯k〉k + 2〈GkYˆ
k
N , Y
k
N 〉N ,
where 
Yˆ kℓ+1 = Ak,ℓYˆ
k
ℓ + Ck,ℓYˆ
k
ℓ wℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk+1,
Yˆ kk+1 = Bk,ku¯k +Dk,ku¯kwk,
Yˆ kk = 0.
If uˆk = u¯k, then
d2J¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;u
t,x,∗
k ; u¯k; u¯k) = 2〈QkY
k, Y k〉Tk + 2〈Rk,ku¯k, u¯k〉k + 2〈GkY
k
N , Y
k
N 〉N . (6.6)
Note that the righthand side of (6.6) is independent of ut,x,∗k . Then, for any uk ∈ L
2
F(k;R
m), we have
d2J¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;uk; u¯k; u¯k) = 2〈QkY
k, Y k〉Tk + 2〈Rk,ku¯k, u¯k〉k + 2〈GkY
k
N , Y
k
N 〉N . (6.7)
Furthermore, we can show that J¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;uk) is infinitely differentiable with respect to uk in the
sense that the directional derivatives of all orders exist. By classical results on convex analysis [8], we
have the following result.
Lemma 6.1. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) The map uk 7→ J¯(k,X
t,x,∗
k ;uk) is convex.
(ii) The following holds
inf
u¯k∈L
2
F
(k;Rm)
[
〈QkY
k, Y k〉Tk + 〈Rk,ku¯k, u¯k〉k + 〈GkY
k
N , Y
k
N 〉N
]
≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 2.4. (i)⇒(ii). Let ut,x,∗ be an open-loop equilibrium control of Problem (LQ)
for the initial pair (t, x). Since J¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;uk) is infinitely differentiable with respect to uk and (6.7)
is independent of uk, the minimum point u
t,x,∗
k of J¯(k,X
t,x,∗
k ;uk) is fully characterized via the first
and second order derivatives, namely, dJ¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;u
t,x,∗
k ; u¯k) = 0 and d
2J¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;u
t,x,∗
k ; u¯k; u¯k) ≥ 0
hold for any u¯k in L
2
F(k;R
m). Following Lemma 6.1, (2.11) holds. The forward S∆E of Xk,∗ is clearly
solvable as Zk,∗ does not appear in this S∆E. After obtaining Xk,∗ and substituting Xk,∗ into the
backward S∆E, we then have Zk,∗. This means that the FBS∆E (2.9) admits a solution (Xk,∗, Zk,∗).
Furthermore, by (6.5), one can get
1
2
dJ¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;u
t,x,∗
k ; u¯k) =
N−1∑
ℓ=k
E
[
(Xk,∗ℓ )
TQk,ℓY
k
ℓ
]
+ E
[
(ut,x,∗k )
TRk,ku¯k
]
+ E
[
(Xk,∗N )
TGkY
t
N
]
=
N−1∑
ℓ=k
E
[
(Xk,∗ℓ )
TQk,ℓY
k
ℓ
]
+ E
[
(ut,x,∗k )
TRk,ku¯k
]
+
N−1∑
ℓ=k
E
[
(Zk,∗ℓ+1)
TY kℓ+1 − (Z
k,∗
ℓ )
TY kℓ
]
=
N−1∑
ℓ=k
E
{[
ATk,ℓE(Z
k,∗
ℓ+1|Fℓ−1) +Qk,ℓX
k,∗
ℓ + C
T
k,ℓE(Z
k,∗
ℓ+1wℓ|Fℓ−1)− Z
k,∗
ℓ
]T
Y kℓ
}
+ E
{[
Rk,ku
t,x,∗
k +B
T
k,kE(Z
k,∗
k+1|Fk−1) +D
T
k,kE(Z
k,∗
k+1wt|Fk−1)
]T
u¯k
}
. (6.8)
As dJ¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;u
t,x,∗
k ; u¯k) = 0 for all u¯k ∈ L
2
F(k;R
m) and the FBS∆E (2.9) is solvable, the stationary
condition (2.10) follows.
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(ii)⇒(i). Note that (6.8), (2.9) and (2.10), we have
dJ¯(k,Xt,x,∗k ;u
t,x,∗
k ; u¯k) = 0, ∀u¯k ∈ L
2
F(k;R
m),
which together with (2.11) implies that ut,x,∗k is a minimizer of J¯(k,X
t,x,∗
k ;uk) over L
2
F(k;R
m). Thus,
(6.1), equivalently (2.5), holds for k ∈ Tt. This proves the conclusion. 
B. Proof of Theorem 3.2
As (3.1) holds for any uk ∈ L2F(k;R
m), in Definition 3.1 (3.1) can be equivalently replaced by
J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (ΦX
k,Φ)|Tk
)
≤ J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (uk +ΦkX
k,uk,Φ
k , (ΦX
k,uk,Φ
)|Tk+1)
)
, (6.9)
where
X
k,uk,Φ
ℓ+1 =
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)
X
k,uk,Φ
ℓ +
(
Ck,ℓ +Dk,ℓΦℓ
)
X
k,uk,Φ
ℓ wℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk+1,
X
k,uk,Φ
k+1 =
(
Ak,k +Bk,kΦk
)
X
k,uk,Φ
k +Bk,kuk +
[(
Ck,k +Dk,kΦk
)
X
k,uk,Φ
k +Dk,kuk
]
wk,
X
k,uk,Φ
k = X
t,x,∗
k .
For any u ∈ L2F(T;R
m), k ∈ T and y ∈ L2F(k;R
m), let
Ĵ(k, y;u|Tk) = E
[
(XkN )
TGkX
k
N
]
+
N−1∑
ℓ=k
E
[
(Xkℓ )
TQk,ℓX
k
ℓ + (ΦℓX
k
ℓ + uℓ)
TRk,ℓ(ΦℓX
k
ℓ + uℓ)
]
, (6.10)
where {
Xkℓ+1 =
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)
Xkℓ +Bk,ℓuℓ +
[(
Ck,ℓ +Dk,ℓΦℓ
)
Xkℓ +Dk,ℓuℓ
]
wℓ,
Xkk = y, ℓ ∈ Tk.
Hence, (6.9) reads as
Ĵ(k,Xt,x,∗k ; 0|Tk) ≤ Ĵ
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ;
(
uk, 0|Tk+1
))
, (6.11)
where 0|Tk is understood as u|Tk = {uk, · · · , uN−1} with uℓ = 0, ℓ ∈ Tk, and similar meaning holds for
0|Tk+1. Therefore, if Φ is a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ), then 0|T will be an
open-loop equilibrium control of the time-inconsistent stochastic LQ problem corresponding to (2.1)
and (6.10). The cost functional (6.10) is differen from (2.3), as in (6.10) crossing terms between Xkℓ
and uℓ appear. The following is to mimic the proof of Theorem 2.4.
For any given Φ = {Φ0, · · · ,ΦN−1} with Φt ∈ Rm×n, t ∈ T, denote above Ĵ
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (uk, 0|Tk+1)
)
and Ĵ(k,Xt,x,∗k ; 0|Tk) by J˜
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ;uk
)
and J˜(k,Xt,x,∗k ; 0), respectively. We now calculate the first
two orders directional derivatives of J˜
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ;uk
)
. Note that
J˜(k,Xt,x,∗k ;uk) = 〈QkX
k,uk,Φ
, X
k,uk,Φ
〉Tk + 〈Rk,k(uk +ΦkX
k,uk,Φ
k ), uk +ΦkX
k,uk,Φ
k 〉k
+ 〈Rk+(ΦX
k,uk,Φ
)|Tk+1 , (ΦX
k,uk,Φ
)|Tk〉Tk + 〈GkX
k,uk,Φ
N , X
k,uk,Φ
N 〉N ,
and
J˜
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ;uk + λu¯k
)
= 〈QkX
k,u,u¯k,Φ,λ
, X
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
〉Tk
+ 〈Rk+(ΦX
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
)|Tk+1 , (ΦX
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
)|Tk+1〉Tk+1
+ 〈Rk,k
(
uk +ΦkX
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
k + λu¯k
)
, uk +ΦkX
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
k
+ λu¯k〉k + 〈GkX
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
N , X
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
N 〉N ,
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where Qk, Rk+ are similarly defined as those in (6.2), and
X
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
ℓ+1 =
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)
X
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
ℓ +
(
Ck,ℓ +Dk,ℓΦℓ
)
X
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
ℓ wℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk+1,
X
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
k+1 =
(
Ak,k +Bk,kΦk
)
X
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
k +Bk,k
(
uk + λu¯k
)
+
[(
Ck,k +Dk,kΦk
)
X
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
k +Dk,k
(
uk + λu¯k
)]
wk,
X
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
k = X
t,x,∗
k .
As X
k,uk,Φ
k = X
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
k = X
t,x,∗
k , we have
X
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
ℓ+1
−X
k,uk,Φ
ℓ+1
λ
=
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)Xk,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
ℓ
−X
k,uk,Φ
ℓ
λ
+
(
Ck,ℓ +Dk,ℓΦℓ
)Xk,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
ℓ
−X
k,uk,Φ
ℓ
λ
wℓ,
X
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
k+1
−X
k,uk,Φ
k+1
λ
= Bk,ku¯k +Dk,ku¯kwk,
X
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
k
−X
k,uk,Φ
k
λ
= 0, ℓ ∈ Tk+1.
Denote
X
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
ℓ
−X
k,Φ
ℓ
λ
by Y k,u¯k,Φk , which is independent of uk and λ. Then,
Y
k,u¯k,Φ
ℓ+1 =
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)
Y
k,u¯k,Φ
ℓ +
(
Ck,ℓ +Dk,ℓΦℓ
)
Y
k,u¯k,Φ
ℓ wℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk+1,
Y
k,u¯k,Φ
k+1 = Bk,ku¯k +Dk,ku¯kwk,
Y
k,u¯k,Φ
k = 0.
(6.12)
For any ℓ ∈ Tk, we have
X
k,uk,u¯k,Φ,λ
ℓ = X
k,uk,Φ
ℓ + λY
k,u¯k,Φ
ℓ . (6.13)
Similar to the deviation of (6.5), we have
dJ˜
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ;uk; u¯k
)
= lim
λ↓0
J˜
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ;uk + λu¯k
)
− J˜
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ;uk
)
λ
= 2〈QkX
k,uk,Φ
, Y k,u¯k,Φ〉Tk + 2〈Rk,k(uk +ΦkX
k,uk,Φ
k ), u¯k〉k
+ 2〈Rk+(ΦX
k,uk,Φ
)|Tk+1 , (ΦY
k,u¯k,Φ)|Tk+1〉Tk+1
+ 2〈GkX
k,uk,Φ
N , Y
k,u¯k,Φ
N 〉N , (6.14)
and for any uˆk ∈ L2F(k;R
m)
d2J˜
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ;uk; u¯k; uˆk
)
= lim
λ↓0
J˜
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ;uk + βuˆk; u¯k
)
− J˜
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ;uk; u¯k
)
β
= 2〈QkYˆ
k,uˆk,Φ, Y k,u¯k,Φ〉Tk + 2〈Rk,kuˆk, u¯k〉k + 2〈Rk+(ΦYˆ
k,uˆk,Φ)|Tk+1 , (ΦY
k,u¯k,Φ)|Tk+1〉Tk+1
+ 2〈GkYˆ
k,uˆk,Φ
N , Y
k,u¯k,Φ
N 〉N ,
where 
Yˆ
k,uˆk,Φ
ℓ+1 =
(
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)
Yˆ
k,uˆk,Φ
ℓ +
(
Ck,ℓ +Dk,ℓΦℓ
)
Yˆ
k,uˆk,Φ
ℓ wℓ, ℓ ∈ Tk+1,
Y
k,uˆk,Φ
k+1 = Bk,kuˆk +Dk,kuˆkwk,
Yˆ
k,uˆk,Φ
k = 0.
If uˆk = u¯k, then we have
d2J˜
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ;uk; u¯k; u¯k
)
= 2〈QkY
k,u¯k,Φ, Y k,u¯k,Φ〉Tk + 2〈Rk,ku¯k, u¯k〉k
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+ 2〈Rk+(ΦY
k,u¯k,Φ)|Tk+1 , (ΦY
k,u¯k,Φ)|Tk+1〉Tk+1
+ 2〈GkY
k,u¯k,Φ
N , Y
k,u¯k,Φ
N 〉N , (6.15)
which is independent of uk.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. (i)⇒(ii). Let Φ be a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ).
As noted above, 0|T is an open-loop equilibrium control of the stochastic LQ problem corresponding
to (2.1) and (6.10). Hence, for all u¯k ∈ L2F(k;R
m) we have
dJ˜
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; 0; u¯k
)
= 0, d2J˜
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; 0; u¯k; u¯k
)
≥ 0. (6.16)
Note that X
k,uk,Φ
ℓ = X
k,Φ
ℓ , ℓ ∈ Tk if uk = 0. Hence, it holds that
0 =
1
2
dJ˜(k,Xt,x,∗k ; 0; u¯k)
=
N−1∑
ℓ=k
E
[((
Ak,ℓ +Bk,ℓΦℓ
)T
E(Zk,Φℓ+1|Fℓ−1) +
(
Ck,ℓ +Dk,ℓΦℓ
)T
E(Zk,Φℓ+1wℓ|Fℓ−1)
+
(
ΦTℓ Rk,ℓΦℓ +Qk,ℓ
)
X
k,Φ
ℓ − Z
k,Φ
ℓ
)T
Y
k,u¯k,Φ
ℓ
]
+ E
[(
Rk,kΦkX
k,Φ
k +B
T
k,kE(Z
k,Φ
k+1|Fk−1)
+DTk,kE(Z
k,Φ
k+1wk|Fk−1)
)T
u¯k
]
= E
[(
Rk,kΦkX
k,Φ
k +B
T
k,kE(Z
k,Φ
k+1|Fk−1) +D
T
k,kE(Z
k,Φ
k+1wk|Fk−1)
)T
u¯k
]
. (6.17)
As u¯k ∈ L2F(k;R
m) can be taken arbitrarily, we can get (3.6). (3.7) follows from (6.15) and (6.16).
(ii)⇒(i). Reversing the procedure of the above proof, we can achieve the conclusion. The proof is
also similar to that of Theorem 2.4. 
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